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Abstract
Social choice deals with the problem of determining a con-
sensus choice from the preferences of different voters. In
the classical setting, the voting rule is fixed beforehand and
full information concerning the preferences of the voters is
provided. Recently, the assumption of full preference infor-
mation has been questioned by a number of researchers
and several methods for eliciting preferences have been
proposed. In this paper we go one step further and we as-
sume that both the voting rule and the voters’ preferences
are partially specified. In this setting, we present an in-
teractive elicitation protocol based on minimax regret and
develop several query strategies that interleave questions
to the chair and questions to the voters in order to attempt
to acquire the most relevant information in order to quickly
converge to optimal or a near-optimal alternative.
Keywords
Computational Social Choice, uncertainty in AI, prefer-
ence elicitation, minimax regret.
1 Introduction
In a traditional social choice setting, both the social choice
function and the full preference orderings of the voters
are expressed beforehand. Nevertheless, in real situations
this is not always the case. When considering decisions
with large sets of alternatives, requiring voters to express
full preference orderings can be prohibitively costly and,
perhaps, not necessary in order to determine a consensus
choice. Furthermore, it is often difficult for non-expert
users to formalize a voting rule on the basis of some generic
preferences over a desired aggregation method. Consider
as an example a situation in which the council of a city
wants to build a community allotment and the decision of
what to grow has to be taken. The voters are the residents
of the neighborhood and the alternatives consist of all the
vegetables that can grow in that particular area. An exter-
nal observer, who is helping with the voting procedure, is
responsible for collecting the preferences of both the res-
idents (regarding the vegetable to grow) and the members
of the council (regarding the method for aggregating the
residents’ preferences). Imagine that, after collecting some
preferences, she notices that some alternatives are always
the least preferred. In this case, it is really unlikely that
these alternatives would be selected as winners by any rea-
sonable voting rule. Thus, she may consider to ask the vot-
ers only their preferences over few strategical alternatives
instead of asking them the full preference orderings. Fur-
thermore, if she notices that a particular vegetable is the
most preferred of almost the totality of the residents there
is no need to know the specific voting rule. Any reasonable
aggregation procedure, in fact, would select this alternative
as a winner. The reasoning behind this is that it is not un-
realistic to assume that the committee, that has to decide
how to aggregate these preferences, is not able to define a
specific procedure.
These observations have motivated a number of recent
works considering social choice with partial preference or-
ders [14, 9, 4] and incremental elicitation [3, 8] of voters’
preferences. Lu and Boutilier [7] proposed the use of min-
imax regret to drive incremental vote and preferences elic-
itation when the social choice function is fixed and known.
Furthermore, several authors [12, 6, 13] worked on posi-
tional scoring rules with uncertain weights, assuming that
the preferences of the voters are fully known. Some elic-
itation methods for a quite general class of rules based on
weak orders have also been proposed by Cailloux and En-
driss [2].
In this paper we focus on positional scoring rules, that are
a particularly common method used to aggregate rankings,
and we assume that both the voters’ preferences and the so-
cial choice rule are partially specified. We develop meth-
ods for computing the minimax-optimal alternative using
positional scoring rules and we provide incremental elici-
tation methods to acquire relevant preference information.
We then discuss several heuristics that determine queries,
either to a voter or to the committee, that quickly reduce
minimax regret. While previous works have considered
either partial information about the voters’ preferences or
a partially specified aggregation method, we do not know
of any work considering both sources of uncertainty at the
same time.
2 Partial information
We consider a set A of m alternatives (products, restau-
rants, public projects, etc.) and a set {1, . . . , n} of vot-
ers. Each voter j comes from an infinite set N of poten-
tial voters and is associated to her “real” preference order
j which is a linear order (connex, transitive, asymmet-
ric relation) over the alternatives. A profile is the associ-
ation of a preference to each voter and it is equivalently
represented by (1, . . . ,n) or by v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V
where vj(i) ∈ {1, . . . ,m} denotes the rank (position) of
alternative i in the preference order j and V is the set of
all possible preference profiles. A social choice function
associates a profile with a set of winners; we consider po-
sitional scoring rules (PSR) which attach weights to posi-
tions according to the scoring vector (w1, . . . , wm). With-
out loss of generality, we assume w1 = 1 and wm = 0.
An alternative x obtains a score that depends on the rank
obtained in each of the preference orders:
sv,w(x) =
n∑
j=1
wvj(x) =
m∑
r=1
αxrwr
where αxr is the number of times that alternative x was
ranked in the r-th position. The winners are the alterna-
tives with highest scores.
In this work we assume fixed, but unknown, a pro-
file v∗ = (∗1, . . . ,∗n) and a weight vector w∗. Our
knowledge at a given time of the preference of voter
j is encoded by a partial order over the alternatives,
thus a transitive and asymmetric binary relation, denoted
by pj ; we assume that preference information is truth-
ful, i.e. a pj b =⇒ a ∗j b. An incomplete profile
p = (p1, . . . ,
p
n) maps each voter to a partial preference.
A completion of pj is any linear order  that extends 
p
j
and we indicate with C(pj) = { ∈ L(A) | 
p
j ⊆ } the
set of possible completions ofpj , where L(A) is the set of
linear orders on A.
Our knowledge regarding the weights of the positional
scoring rule is represented by a set of constraints restrain-
ing the possible values that they can take. We consider a
convex sequence of weights and we assume that the chair
is able to specify additional preferences about how the so-
cial choice function should behave. Such requirements are
encoded with linear constraints about the vector w and the
set of these constraints is denoted by CW . Given the set
of convex weight vectors W , we use W ⊆ W to denote
the set of weight vectors compatible with the chair’s pref-
erences. We will provide an example of such constraints,
used to specify information about weights, in Section 4.
3 Robust winner determination
As a decision criterion to determine a winner, we propose
to use minimax regret [11]. This concept has been used
for robust optimization under data uncertainty [5] as well
as in decision-making with uncertain utility values [10, 1].
Lu and Boutilier [7] have adopted this criterion for win-
ner determination in social choice with the preferences of
the voters that are only partially known, while the social
choice function is predetermined and known. We use max-
imum regret to quantify the worst-case error, which mea-
sures, intuitively, how far an alternative is from the optimal
one given current knowledge; the alternatives that mini-
mize this error are selected as tied winners. The maximum
regret of an alternative is the highest possible difference be-
tween its score and the one achievable by any alternative in
any state compatible with our current knowledge. It is con-
sidered by assuming that an adversary can both 1) extend
the partial profile p into a complete one, and 2) instantiate
the weights choosing among any weight vector in W . We
formalize the notion of minimax regret in multiple steps.
First of all, Regretv,w(x) is the “regret” of selecting x as
a winner instead of choosing the optimal alternative under
v and w:
Regretv,w(x) = max
y∈A
sv,w(y)− sv,w(x).
The pairwise max regret PMRp,W (x, y) of x relative to
y given partial profile p and the set of weights W is the
worst-case loss of choosing x instead of y under all possi-
ble realizations of the full profile and weights. Max regret
MRp,W (x) is the worst-case loss of x and MMRp,W is
the value of minimax regret obtained when recommending
a minimax optimal alternative.
PMRp,W (x, y) = max
w∈W
max
v∈C(p)
sv,w(y)− sv,w(x) (1)
MRp,W (x) = max
y∈A
PMRp,W (x, y) (2)
MMRp,W = min
x∈A
MRp,W (x) (3)
x∗p,W = argmin
x∈A
MRp,W (x) ∈ A∗p,W (4)
By picking as consensus choice an alternative associ-
ated with minimax regret x∗p,W ∈ A∗p,W , we can provide
a recommendation that gives worst-case guarantees, giving
some robustness in face of uncertainty. In cases of ties in
minimax regret, we can either decide to return all minimax
alternativesA∗p,W as winners or to pick just one of them us-
ing a tie-breaking strategy. Because the constraints in CW
are not necessarily linear PMR is not straightforwardly op-
timized, but it can be computed by adapting the reasoning
of Lu and Boutilier [7] to the case of uncertain weights us-
ing linear programming. This optimization strategy uses
the assumption of convexity.
4 Interactive elicitation
We propose an incremental elicitation method based on
minimax regret. At each step, the system may ask a ques-
tion either to one of the voters or to the chair. The goal is
to acquire relevant information to reduce minimax regret
as quickly as possible. As termination condition of elicita-
tion, we can check whether minimax regret is lower than a
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threshold or, if we wish optimality, we can perform elicita-
tion until minimax regret drops to zero.
Question types We distinguish between questions asked
to the voters and questions asked to the chair. For the first
we consider comparison queries that ask a particular voter
to compare two alternatives. Then, the partial profile p is
augmented on the basis of the voter’s answer. Thus, if voter
j answers a comparison query stating that alternative a is
preferred to b, then the partial order pj is augmented with
a pj b and by transitive closure. The query for the chair,
instead, aims at refining our knowledge about the scoring
rule; in particular, we assume we can acquire constraints of
the type:
wr − wr+1 ≥ λ(wr+1 − wr+2)
for r ∈ {1, . . . ,m−2}, relating the difference between the
importance of consecutive ranks.
Elicitation strategies A strategy is a function (or a ran-
dom process) that, given our partial knowledge so far, gives
us a question that should be asked.
The Random strategy first decides with a probability of
1/2 each whether it will ask a question about weights or
about a preference ordering. Then it equiprobably draws a
question among the set of the possible ones. This strategy
is clearly non efficient but it gives us a baseline for com-
parisons.
The Extreme completions strategy considers the solution
of the minimax regret game, given the current knowledge,
and estimates the contribution to the regret of our uncer-
tainty about the weights and the profile. Then, it selects a
question for the chair or for the voters depending on which
of these two values is the highest.
The Pessimistic strategy selects among all the possible
questions the one that leads to minimal regret in the worst
case. Because all our questions are binary questions, for
each of them the pessimistic strategy first assumes the an-
swer is "No", it updates the knowledge according to this
negative answer and computes the minimax regret. Then,
it does the same assuming the answer is positive. Finally,
it uses some aggregation of these two MMR values (for ex-
ample max or avg) as a score of the question. The question
with the highest score is selected.
The Two phase strategy asks a predefined, non adaptive
sequence of m− 2 questions to the chair in order to gather
informations about the weights w of the scoring rule, using
one question per rank except the extreme ones that we are
assuming known (w1 = 1, wm = 0). Then it only asks
questions about the voters, using questions as defined in
the Pessimistic strategy.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have considered a social choice setting
with partial information and we have proposed the use of
minimax regret both as a means of robust winner determi-
nation as well as a guide to the process of simultaneous
elicitation of preferences and voting rule.
The next step is to test our strategies in order to compare
the performance of our interleaved elicitation approach that
mixes questions to the chair and to the voters, to a more
classical approach that elicits the rule first and then the vot-
ers’ preferences (or vice-versa).
Further development of elicitation strategies, consider-
ing alternative heuristics, is also an important direction for
future work together with the extension of the approach to
voting rules beyond scoring rules.
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